The Usefulness of Moral Theory in Practical Ethics: A Question of Comparative Cost (A Response to Harris) by Davis, Michael
THE USEFULNESS OF MORAL THEORY IN PRACTICAL 
ETHICS: A QUESTION OF COMPARATIVE COST (A 
RESPONSE TO HARRIS)
Michael Davis
Illinois Institute of Technology
I find myself agreeing with almost everything in Harris’s defense of
moral theory except the end:
moral theories can often be useful in resolving moral
dilemmas.1 Both students and practitioners of practical ethics
should be constantly reminded of this, because in practical eth-
ics we need all of the help we can get.2
If (as it seems) these two sentences state the conclusion, Harris has com-
mitted a non sequitur. While making a good argument for the general use-
fulness of moral theory in practical ethics, he has not made any argument
for its usefulness to students or practitioners as such. He has simply
assumed that what is true of some who engage in practical ethics is true
of students and practitioners in particular. In theory, of course, moral the-
ory should be useful even to students and practitioners, helping them to
identify issues they might have overlooked, to seek information they
might otherwise not have thought relevant, and to formulate courses of
action that might not otherwise have occurred to them. In practice, how-
ever, moral theory will seldom, if ever, be useful (or, at least, useful
enough). We do not (as Harris claims) need all the help we can get in
practical ethics. What we need is all the help we can get at reasonable
cost. We should only invest the time and effort needed to learn and use
moral theory when the investment is no greater than for an otherwise
equally useful alternative. Since there is at least one equally useful alterna-
tive requiring much less investment, the time and effort students and
practitioners would have to invest in moral theory will (in general) be
much greater than necessary for their purposes. So, neither students nor
practitioners need moral theory. 
By “student,” I mean the sort of person an instructor is likely to find
in front of her when teaching a course like Engineering Ethics, Business69
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makes a living as an engineer, business manager, government official, or
the like. I do not mean someone who serves as an ethics consultant, pub-
lishes scholarly work on practical ethics, or otherwise qualifies as an “eth-
ics expert.” For what Harris or I do, moral theory can be useful in the
ways Harris specifies—and well worth the extra investment it takes to use
it (the costs of learning having long since been paid). But Harris’s conclu-
sion concerns “students and practitioners,” not “ethics experts.”
MORAL THEORY IN THE CLASSROOM AND PRACTICE
Let us begin with the classroom. The first problem with teaching
moral theory in a course in practical ethics concerns the instructor. We
may distinguish at least three sorts of instructor: 1) qualified moral theo-
rists; 2) philosophers, religious ethicists, or the like who have taken some
moral theory courses (whether graduate or undergraduate); and 3) ordi-
nary professors of engineering, business, or the like who have picked up a
little moral theory along the way (generally, from reading on their own or
from teaching the course before). For purposes of argument, we may
assume that a qualified moral theorist will know enough moral theory to
teach the two theories that Harris suggests are enough for practical pur-
poses, utilitarianism and “PR theory” (respect-for-persons). But what
about those instructors in practical ethics, probably the majority, who are
not moral theorists? What reason do we have to believe that they can do
a decent job of teaching even these two theories?
Harris’s answer would, I suppose, be that those instructors not “eth-
ics experts” will have a text to draw on, something like his own Engineer-
ing Ethics. The most recent edition of that excellent book has ten pages on
moral theory, five on utilitarianism and five on PR theory.3 The discus-
sion of utilitarianism offers three versions of that theory: cost-benefit
analysis (apparently to serve as a bridge to the theory proper), act-utilitar-
ianism, and rule-utilitarianism. The book does much the same for PR
theory, distinguishing three versions: the golden-rule approach, the self-
defeating approach, and the rights approach. Harris has, in other words,
boiled down an enormous literature to ten pages.
Given the space used, the exposition is impressive. But much has
been sacrificed. For example, there is far too little about how to measure
utility if not (as in cost-benefit analysis) in money. All Harris says is
“greatest good.” Determining what “greatest good” means could easily
fill a graduate seminar in philosophy, indeed, even determining how to
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ing Harris for failing to say more. I am simply pointing out how limited
his exposition of the theory is in fact (and, given the scale of his book,
must be). 
Judging by allocation of space (half a page to act-utilitarianism
against one-and-a-half pages to rule-utilitarianism), Harris prefers rule-
utilitarianism. Yet, in the form he gives it, rule-utilitarianism is generally
thought to be equivalent to act-utilitarianism. So, why bother with this
distinction at all? Harris’s answer seems to be that this sort of rule-utili-
tarianism is valuable in practice even if not in theory: “The rule utilitarian
approach to problems brings to our attention an important distinction in
moral thinking” (the importance of thinking beyond the particular prob-
lem and its solution).4
I could say more along these lines concerning Harris’s treatment of
utilitarianism— and of his treatment of PR theory as well. But I will not
because I think I have already made my point. Whatever it is that the typ-
ical instructor in practical ethics will learn from the short presentation of
“moral theory” in a text like Engineering Ethics, it is not moral theory in the
sense Harris uses the term in his defense of moral theory—but some-
thing much less subtle, a set of rough decision rules or questions with
which to approach a practical problem. An instructor who does not
know much more about utilitarianism or PR theory than Harris tells him
is in no position to teach the theory, only to teach those few rules or
questions.
Those instructors who, though not moral theorists, know more of
moral theory than the self-taught, that is, those philosophers, religious
ethicists, or the like who have taken some moral theory courses, should
be able to teach more moral theory than the self-taught. There are, how-
ever, at least two questions remaining about what they will teach. One is
how much moral theory the classroom will allow them to teach. I will
deal with that question soon. I will consider the other question now:
what reason is there to think that such non-experts will get the moral the-
ory they do teach right?
Most moral theorists have, I think, noticed how often those who
know something of moral theory but are not expert get a moral theory
wrong or, at least, fail to appreciate how problematic certain interpreta-
tions of it are. Harris’s defense of moral theory’s usefulness seems to
assume some quality control on the theory taught (for example, the qual-
ity control Harris’s own book might impose). But, where theory is taught
by those not expert, there is generally no quality control. Someone who
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thin Harris’s explication is, there must often be a temptation to say more
when an instructor thinks he knows more (whether he in fact knows
more or not).
That is enough about the instructor. Now, what about the students?
Let’s suppose they have an instructor like Harris, someone who actually
understands moral theory. How much moral theory can such an instruc-
tor teach typical students enrolled in Engineering Ethics, Business Ethics,
or other courses in practical ethics? That question will have a somewhat
different answer depending on the amount of time the instructor is will-
ing to allocate to teaching moral theory. Harris’s text suggests that the
instructor would allocate one or (at most) two hours in a semester course
(a course of 50 or so hours) to teach the students the basics of utilitarian-
ism and PR theory.5
When I teach an undergraduate course in moral theory, I devote at
least four weeks (12 classroom hours) to utilitarianism and about as long
to PR theory. That’s at least twelve times as much as Harris’ text suggests
be allocated to the same project. Perhaps I am a bad teacher. But after so
much more time trying to teach the two moral theories, my students still
have only a very rough grasp of them. I would not want my life to
depend on their understanding of either theory. My experience with stu-
dents who do not sign up for the moral theory course but instead take
Engineering Ethics, Business Ethics, or another course in practical ethics
is even less happy. Most of them seem to go blank as soon as I start to
explain a moral theory. Is Harris much more successful at teaching moral
theory than I am? Even if he is, what are we to expect from the ordinary
instructor?
That brings me to the world outside the classroom. The typical prac-
titioner is a former undergraduate who has forgotten much of what he
learned in Engineering Ethics, Business Ethics, or the like years ago
(assuming any formal training in practical ethics). If the typical practitio-
ner had any moral theory as an undergraduate or graduate student
(which, of course, the typical practitioner did not), he did not learn
enough to use moral theory reliably then. So, now that the theory is no
longer fresh in mind, how likely is it that the typical practitioner will make
reliable use of it now?
Harris has, I think, as philosophers often do, confused the ideal
world with the actual one. His defense of moral theory as useful to stu-
dents and practitioners is a philosopher’s dream, perhaps true in theory
but certainly not in practice.
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One conclusion that might be drawn from the foregoing argument
is that students (and practitioners) need more moral theory, not less, say,
a whole course or more before they take Engineering Ethics, Business
Ethics, or the like. While there are doubtless many reasons to require
every student to take one or more courses in moral theory, that they will
act more ethically is not one of them. There is no evidence that students
who take even several courses in moral theory are more likely to act ethi-
cally than those who take none.6 And we should, I think, have substantial
evidence that moral theory does benefit students enough in that way
before imposing a required course on them for that reason. A require-
ment should rest on more than a well-meaning belief that the course will
do some good.
Anyway, the failures of teaching a little moral theory do not force
the conclusion that what is needed is more moral theory. There is good
reason to think that no amount of teaching moral theory can be justified
by the better practical decision-making likely to result. We have already
noticed that what Harris’s text in fact seems to teach is not so much two
moral theories as six rough but useful ways to think about an ethical
problem. We might then try to boil down other moral theories in the way
Harris has boiled down utilitarianism and PR theory. Indeed, we might
even try to boil down those two theories further (turning them into a half
dozen or so questions, tests, or directives). What we would then have is a
list to guidelines to help students or practitioners think through specific
ethical problems. Here is such a list (one I have used—as part of a larger
decision procedure in place of moral theory—when teaching Architec-
ture Ethics, Business Ethics, Engineering Ethics, and the like):
• Harm test—does this option do less harm than any alternative?
• Publicity test—would I want my choice of this option published in 
the newspaper?
• Defensibility test—could I defend my choice of this option before 
a Congressional committee, a committee of my peers, or my parents?
• Reversibility test—would I still think the choice of this option good 
if I were one of those adversely affected by it?
• Virtue test—what would I become if I choose this option often?
• Professional test—what might my profession's ethics committee 
say about this option?
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problem and suggest this option as my solution?
• Organization test—what does the organization's ethics officer or 
legal counsel say about this?
This is neither the only list possible nor necessarily the best.7 All I
claim here is that it will serve in place of moral theory—doing pretty
much everything teaching moral theory is supposed to do in a practical eth-
ics course or for a practitioner with a problem but at lower cost in time
and effort.
That these tests correspond (roughly) to various moral theories
should, I think, be obvious to theorists. The harm test asks about the
consequences of a particular act (or policy). It is, then, an act-utilitarian
test (though it is silent about benefits). The publicity test asks a question
a typical PR theory would suggest, since what we do not want others to
know is generally (but not always) something that fails to respect their
agency. Something similar would be true of the defensibility and the
reversibility tests. The virtue test asks a question that both rule-utilitarian-
ism and virtue theory suggest. The last three tests (professional, col-
league, and organizational) ask questions we might associate with
relativist theories. For those who think rights represent a distinct cate-
gory of moral concern, a “rights test” might be added (say, “Does this
option violate anyone’s rights?”). The same for care theory, feminist the-
ory, natural law theory, or the like (for example, “Would I choose this
option if I cared about the people affected?).
What makes these tests easier to teach than moral theory is that they
are drawn directly from common sense. Students can apply them with
reasonable accuracy almost as soon as they have read them because they
have in fact already been applying them more or less (though generally
using one to make a decision and forgetting the rest). The problem with
this method, if it is a problem, is that there is no simple routine for deal-
ing with an option that passes some tests but not others—except to
develop a new option that does better. I do not think that is a problem
for two reasons.
First, Harris makes the point that while all moral theories aspire to
completeness, none in fact achieves it. That is why he wants to teach at
least two moral theories (and would, apparently, teach more if he had
time). The second theory is to catch relevant considerations the first lets
slip. Neither theory is to be treated as decisive. Thus the problem of
choosing among “tests” (or theories) is not a feature distinguishing my
approach from Harris’s—and, according to Harris, it is not a problem at
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pleteness of all moral theories. We use the theories as heuristics (as means
of learning more about the problem before us); we are not to let any the-
ory make the decision for us. The same is true for my “tests.”
A second reason that disagreement among the tests is not a problem
is that, insofar as my approach differs from Harris’s, mine is more likely
to catch relevant considerations that slip past Harris’s moral theories.
After all, Harris’s approach relies on just two theories (each in three vari-
eties). My approach, however implicitly, relies on at least four. Insofar as
Harris is right that moral theories are in fact imperfect guides to conduct,
my approach must be better than his. All else equal, four different screens
should catch more of what we want to catch than two.
Indeed, I think the worry about conflicting test results may itself be
the product of thinking of these tests as (nascent) theories. When theo-
ries conflict, we are inclined to choose between the two theories. They
cannot all be right. Insofar as all are moral theories, they are competing
for the same title, Correct Moral Theory. Each includes the implicit claim
that all other moral theories, or at least all others interestingly different,
are inadequate (if not just plain wrong). Thinking in terms of moral tests
rather than moral theories does not carry the same implicit claim. Each
test can be relevant without being decisive. We are used to having more
than one imperfect way to check for something (say, inoperable prostate
cancer, lying in a witness, or good water under our land). If all the tests
point to the same answer, we are relatively confident. If some point to
one answer and some to another and we have time, we may use a more
expensive test. If we lack time, we may decide, aware that we are taking a
gamble.
If (as rarely happens) a student asks why a certain test works, we
need not explain the moral theory it stands in for (though we could). We
may simply advise the student to take Ethics (or Moral Theory) next
term and, in the meantime, not to use the test if she does not see the
point of it. We might even ask her to suggest a replacement.
CONCLUSION
When I teach moral theory, I stress that the theories are supposed to be
extensionally equivalent (that is, yield the same decisions as the others at
least in cases considered clear)—even though they approach decisions in
radically different ways. Any theory not extensionally equivalent to the
others will, in that respect at least, be open to counter-example, and every
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are great in part at least because they found ways for their moral theory
to absorb (or otherwise disarm) many of the supposed counter-examples
(and related objections). Moral theory is a sort of arms race between the-
orists who develop new counter-examples (or related objections) and
theorists who find ways to absorb them into the theory. The theories as
such, the few simple principles that constitute their opening statement,
are not what make moral theory interesting to those of us who like doing
moral theory. Those principles generally come from common sense, phi-
losophers contributing little more than clarity and precision. What makes
moral theory interesting is the arms race. Can we find a counter-example
that will shake up those who defend this or that theory? Can we absorb
this or that supposed counter-example that now seems to threaten our
theory?
For anyone else but a moral theorist that arms race is not likely to be
interesting (which explains the blank look on so many students in practi-
cal ethics whenever I get into the details of a moral theory). What often
does interest many non-theorist is a certain version of the moral theory
understood as a decision procedure rather than an attempt to understand
morality. What interests the non-theorist is typically something strikingly
novel about the decision procedure, for example, that it gives clear results
where the usual ways of thinking about a problem do not—the very fea-
ture that, for a theorist, is a sign of trouble. For that reason alone, I think
a little moral theory, say, an hour or two in a semester, is dangerous—
more likely to mislead students and practitioners than to lead them to a
good decision. I always worry when a student begins a response to a
practical problem with some such words as this: “I am a utilitarian [or a
Kantian or whatever] and therefore I would….” What usually follows is a
caricature: Mill or Kant as Voltaire would have presented him in Candide.
What we want from students and practitioners alike is instead something
like, “All things considered, including the consequences, our purposes,
what my colleagues would do…., I would….” The test approach
defended here is, I think, more likely to achieve that than the moral-the-
ory approach, however boiled down the theory. For students and practi-
tioners, the less said about theory, the better.
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1 I have an objection to the use of “dilemma” here. What Harris seems to
intend is “problem.” “Dilemma” is a useful term from logic for a choice
between two options that are or at least seem to be mutually exclusive, exhaus-
tive, and equally unfavorable. “Dilemma” should be saved for that unusual
choice, not wasted on situations that might more accurately be described in
less melodramatic terms. Harris’s own example of a dilemma in which moral
theory might help, the Engineer James case, does not seem to be a dilemma at
all (Harris, 10). James has several options open to him beside simply keeping
the secret or simply using it. He might, for example, check with his present
company’s legal department to see whether the “secret,” the general approach
to organizing the assembly line, is legally a trade secret (given that James him-
self developed the approach). The lawyer may suggest that the company can
simply buy the right to use the secret. The engineer might also want to check
with his professional society to determine whether this is even the sort of
information an engineer should keep secret. (My impression is that what the
knowledge James wishes to use is the sort engineers are supposed to share.)
Practical ethics would be better if the term “dilemma,” with its suggestion of
only two bad options, were banned outright.
2 Charles E. Harris, “Is Moral Theory Useful in Practical Ethics?” Teaching Eth-
ics, Fall 2009.
3 Charles E. Harris, Michael S. Pritchard, and Michael J. Rabins, Engineering
Ethics: Cases and Concept, 4th Edition (Wadsworth: Belmont, CA, 2009), 58-69.
4 Harris, Pritchard, and Rabins, 63.
5 I reach this (rough) number—about 1 in 30— by dividing the 10 pages Har-
ris assigns moral theory in his text by the total number of pages in the text
(299)—and assuming he might expect an instructor to skip some sections on
specific issues in engineering ethics.
6 The only evidence here concerns moral judgment and philosophy courses in
general. Graduate students in philosophy average higher scores on tests of
moral judgment than most other graduate students—and than most under-
graduates or practitioners. See, for example, James Rest, "The Major Compo-
nents of Morality,” in Morality, Moral Development, and Moral Behavior, W.
Kurtines and J. Gewirtz (eds.), New York, Wiley, 1985, pp. 24-38 (and research
described there). Unfortunately, this evidence leaves open several questions
relevant here, including: whether the moral theory component of philosophy
training is what explains the higher average score; whether these philosophy
students are in practice any more moral than those with lower scores on moral
judgment; and what moral judgment has to do with the ethical judgment we
seek to teach in engineering ethics, business ethics, or the like.
7 For several other lists, see http://commfaculty.fullerton.edu/lester/courses/517/
decision_making.doc (accessed October 24, 2009). See also the quite different list
in Bernard Gert, A New Justification of the Moral Rules (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1988), 285.
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